I recently stumbled across an almost ten-year-old cable from
the U.S. Embassy in The Hague back to the State Department in Washington. Classified “Secret,” the document now resides
openly in the ether, courtesy of Wikileaks.
Two careers ago, I had some experience with drafting such
cables as a Foreign Service Officer posted in Latin America, with additional service
in Europe and Washington (a “cable,” incidentally, is a fancy word for what passes as an email in
today’s parlance, the former simply pre-dating the latter, and the word lives
on).
Generally speaking, the Officer drafting the cable has carte
blanche and is trusted to capture his or her recollections of an event or
observations on a topic, subject to the editorial review of senior officers for
either substance or tone or both.
Once the cable is sent and distributed, it and its content
take on the nature of “fact.”
What struck me about this particular cable was the fact-based reporting of a remarkably non-fact-based interaction between
U.S. and Dutch Government officials.
According to the cable, Embassy staff were joined by U.S.
Commerce and Defense Department export control officials in
briefing Dutch officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economics and
Defense on a U.S. Government “non-paper,” about which no detail is provided in
the cable.
We can divine, however, by the subsequent reporting on the
Dutch officials’ response, that the U.S. delegation and the mystery non-paper
were focused on (wait for it regular readers) disrupting the international
supply chain of China-based technology companies, including Huawei, my ever-beleaguered
employer.
It seems that the Dutch, with global commercial realities in
mind, took the time to explain to the U.S. delegation that Huawei was a major global
telecom gear manufacturer and a customer of Dutch suppliers, of, e.g.
analog-to-digital converters (ADCs).
Quoting from the cable: One of the Dutch representatives “…thanked the U.S. side for its information
and remarked that Huawei, for example, was among the largest telecommunications
base station manufacturers in China and a probable Philips customer.”
The U.S. side was quick to counter that “firms that are established ‘defense contractors’ to the PLA and have
extensive ties to PRC national security agencies cannot be...trusted…”
I have no doubt that there is some truth to that concern. But Huawei, in the world of facts, is demonstrably no such firm.
The U.S. went on, however, to comment that “the only companies that can be trusted… are
those that are strictly focused on the civilian market... “
Ding, ding, ding… Now
that little descriptive would, in fact, apply to Huawei.
But facts be damned.
So, what’s my point?
Simply put, that mis-informed – albeit quite possibly intentionally so –
U.S. Government representatives have been spreading Huawei FUD for the better
part of a decade, and, each and every time they’ve done so, they’ve contributed
to an ever-bloated body of “facts” built on little more than bullshit.
But God bless the Dutch.
Commercially rational, and in the context of sound and fair
regulatory policy, the Dutch, per the cable, explained their plans to require “ADC buyers to track and account for their
ADC inventory, rather than prohibiting altogether ADC sales to certain
companies."
Further from the Dutch Government representative: ‘It would be hard,’ he concluded, ‘to shut
out Huawei, one of the biggest players’ in China's third generation cell phone
program…With this in mind, the GONL had been drafting sales contract language
requiring 14-bit ADC buyers to put parts control programs in place for the
converters.”
Ten years later, belated applause…
(Link to the cable: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04THEHAGUE3156_a.html)
(Link to the cable: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04THEHAGUE3156_a.html)