Two days ago, the online radical conservative
publication The Washington Free Beacon featured an article authored by
Sino-phobe and habitual Huawei-basher Bill Gertz.
Titled “Congress Targets Chinese Telecom Threat,” Gertz’s
piece vomits up copious amounts of Huawei FUD and slander in its hyper-maniacal
applause for a pair of Congressional amendments which, while setting
trade-distorting precedents like-as-not to be used against American companies overseas, probably won't achieve much in terms of addressing any legitimate national
security concerns.
Let’s parse through this turd of an article:
(And, lest
anyone forget, Huawei is my employer, but the words, sentiments and opinions in
this blog are mine and mine alone, unvetted by anyone).
Gertz’s words are in italics, my
observations, in bold:
Current House
intelligence and defense legislation now before Congress is seeking to block
U.S. intelligence officials from working for Chinese-linked companies, and also
is aimed at preventing a major Chinese telecommunications firm from conducting
cyber attacks against defense and intelligence networks.
“Chinese-linked companies?” Uh… In
terms of the information and communications technology industry, that’s pretty
much everyone.
Two amendments now
part of the fiscal 2015 intelligence and defense authorization bills target
China’s Huawei Technologies, a company linked by the U.S. government to
electronic spying, although the company is not named specifically in the
legislation, members of Congress and aides said.
The intelligence bill
amendment would prevent former U.S. intelligence officials from joining
companies like Huawei, which the U.S. government has linked to China’s military
and illicit spying through its network equipment.
Except that is not
the case. First off, the U.S. Government
has, in fact, never – never – cited a shred of credible evidence of any unusual
link between Huawei and any government, nor has there ever been any allegation
of illicit spying through Huawei network equipment or otherwise. Being gracious, the USG has at most suggested
only potential or prospective concerns.
Indeed, with all of
this in mind, and as explained to Gertz in an email exchange in advance of the
publication of his article, the “covered entity” definition in the intelligence
bill amendment in no way, shape or form applies to Huawei. No-one – no-one – has ever once – not once –
offered a shred of credible or substantive information to suggest otherwise.
The defense bill
amendment would require the director of national intelligence and secretary of
defense to report to Congress on all bids by foreign telecommunications companies
seeking U.S. contracts.
Both measures are
being dubbed the Rogers’ amendments after their Republican sponsors: Rep. Mike
Rogers of Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence; and Rep. Mike Rogers of Alabama, chairman of the House Armed
Services subcommittee on strategic forces. “I am greatly
concerned Chinese-government-controlled telecommunications companies could pose
a direct threat to our national security,” said Rogers of Alabama who sponsored
the defense amendment.
“We need to make sure
we’re protecting all levels of our infrastructure,” he said. “This is an issue
that affects big cities, small towns, and military bases in every corner of the
U.S. and those overseas as well.”
These seem like
legitimate concerns. But contrary to
Gertz’s or anyone else’s willfully uninformed opinion, Huawei is not “Chinese-government
controlled,” so, as pointed out to Gertz via email before his article ran, the
amendment has no relevancy to Huawei.
And, as further
communicated to Gertz by email, the defense bill amendment is extremely worrisome in terms
of its very broad and trade-distorting precedent-setting nature. In this context, I commented to Gertz: “…One can only hope that a responsible, rational and transparent process
will be developed and communicated to explain how a finding of “suspected of
being influenced” might be made, and that strict and rational and transparent
rules will be developed to define the character and fact-based validity of the
substance of the required “Elements of Notification” (section c, 1-3). Otherwise, the risk of generating copycat
techno-nationalist like policy, law or regulations in other markets is great,
and to the detriment of U.S. businesses operating overseas.”
Both amendments passed
the House last month and now face House-Senate conferences.
Huawei spokesman Bill Plummer declined to comment on the legislation.
Well, I did offer the observations noted above, but Gertz seemed to have little
interest in alternative perceptions. He
is correct, however, that I did not offer any official Huawei on-the-record
comment – I mean, really, why would any company dignify this nonsense with a
response?
Rep. Frank Wolf, (R.,
Va.) said he supports both measures, and specifically the intelligence
employees restriction. Wolf was the first to reveal last year that Huawei had
hired Theodore Moran, who worked on two government intelligence advisory panels
at the same time he was paid consultant for the Chinese company.
“I think it’s good
amendment and it’s a problem I think neither [Republican or Democratic]
administration has addressed,” Wolf said in an interview. “When you get a guy
connected to some of these groups who comes in and advises an administration on
public policy, it’s not a good idea.”
Ah yes,
Representative Wolf… Another unabashed
basher with questionable interest in the facts.
But hey, I'll give credit where credit is due: At least this time he didn’t reference George Clooney (for more on this and to put Rep. Wolf’s opinions in
perspective, please see my April
29, 2012 blog post).
Susan Phalen, a
spokeswoman for the House intelligence committee, said the amendment is needed
to protect secrets. Senior intelligence officials gain access to the nation’s
most sensitive secrets during their careers, she said in an email.
“This provision would
help avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of impropriety in
post-government employment funded by governments that pose a high
counterintelligence threat to the United States,” Phalen said. “These limits
are analogous to the restrictions on executive and legislative branch employees
who seek to lobby the federal government after they leave public service.”
I’ll leave her alone.
She’s just a mouthpiece.
The global Chinese
telecommunications equipment maker is widely viewed within the U.S.
intelligence and military communities as an arm of the Chinese government that
is engaged in clandestine intelligence collection through its equipment.
Nonsense. There has never – never - been any USG claim
that Huawei is “an arm of the Chinese government,” nor that the company is “engaged
in clandestine intelligence collection through its equipment.” As stated earlier, any ill-founded or
politically-inspired concerns have virtually always been prospective.
The Pentagon’s annual
report on the Chinese military has linked Huawei to Beijing’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). “Information technology companies in particular,
including Huawei, Datang and Zhongxing, maintain close ties to the PLA,” a
report several years ago said.
Yawn. ‘Been reading this bullet since the 2005 Rand
Report introduced the fallacy. There is
zero evidence to back it up. Never has been.
The first Rogers
amendment is a response to the case of a senior adviser to the Director of
National Intelligence (DNI), Theodore Moran, who worked for DNI as an adviser
at the same time he was a paid consultant to Huawei.
The provision prevents
all U.S. intelligence officials with access to sensitive compartmented
information, the most secret classified information category, from working with
suspect foreign companies for a period of one year after leaving government.
For two years following retirement, covered intelligence officials cannot work
for an outside foreign company on any matter relating to their work for spy
agencies during the last year of employment.
It also would require
former intelligence officials to report to their former agencies any payments
received from suspect foreign employers.
Both requirements would
be imposed for five years.
Seems reasonable.
The measure also
requires the designation of certain governments that that are classified as “a
significant counterintelligence threat,” such as China and Russia.
The Obama
administration, according to observers, has been lax in pursuing foreign
intelligence agents. Since the 2010 arrests of 10 Russian undercover agents,
the administration has not apprehended a single significant foreign spy.
The second Rogers
amendment calls on the defense secretary and DNI to notify Congress if every
foreign-influenced company or its affiliate “is competing for, or has been
awarded a contract” that could impact military or intelligence systems.
To the point I made
to Gertz in our email exchange, how might “foreign-influenced” be
determined? Based on facts?
The legislation
specifies the networks as “information technology or telecommunications
networks of the Department of Defense or the intelligence community; and
information technology or telecommunications networks of network operators
supporting systems in proximity to Department of Defense or intelligence
community facilities.”
A U.S. official said
the provision is aimed at preventing companies like Huawei from infiltrating
rural U.S. and other networks through sales of equipment to local
telecommunications firms, as has occurred in the past, in an effort to avoid
federal security scrutiny.
“Infiltrating?” “An effort to avoid federal security
scrutiny?” Good grief. Huawei has been
operating openly in the United States since 2001, serving a number of carriers,
rural and otherwise, as a result of open and competitive bidding
processes.
“We’ve seen Huawei go
under the radar in seeking to infiltrate rural providers,” the official said.
“We have to be careful that we don’t wake up in five years and find that 20
percent of the country is using Huawei equipment.”
“Under the radar?” See above. Who is this shallow, duplicitous scare-mongering “official”
that Gertz is quoting?
The amendment also was
written broadly enough to capture the recent deal between Huawei and South
Korea’s LG that has raised concerns about the security of U.S. military
communications in a potential war zone.
U.S. intelligence and
military officials have said allowing Huawei to build a South Korean network
could compromise U.S. military communications in a future conflict on the
Korean Peninsula.
Chris Bush, a
spokesman for the U.S. Forces Korea, told the Free Beacon last month that the
command is concerned about the contract between Huawei and the South Korean
company LG as a potential security problem.
“Telecommunications
equipment is inherently vulnerable to a multitude of threats, from interception
and monitoring to malicious software and applications, regardless of service
provider,” Bush said in response to questions about the Huawei-LG deal.
Hey. Wait…
“Telecommunications equipment is inherently vulnerable to a multitude of
threats, from interception and monitoring to malicious software and
applications, regardless of service provider…”
Spot on Chris. I mean, the NSA has certainly proven this
point, and, further, has demonstrated that it doesn’t matter which company
built the gear, nor where any company may be headquartered.
Rogers of Michigan
said earlier this year that he opposes permitting Huawei to set up a
telecommunications network in South Korea.
“Allowing Huawei
equipment into South Korea’s advanced wireless network could create dangerous
operational security vulnerabilities for the U.S. and South Korean military and
government personnel who will inevitably use this network,” Rogers said.
"Intelligence" Committee Chairman? Really?
Huawei is supplying commercial telecommunications
infrastructure equipment built to open and globally-specified technical
standards for deployment by a commercial operator in a commercial network in
South Korea.
Really Mike?
Our military and government are sending secure communications over open
commercial wireless networks?
The defense amendment
would require the DNI to report to Congress annually on whether suspect foreign
companies are competing for or were awarded contracts related to information
technology or telecommunications components.
“Suspect?” See comments above about “foreign-influenced.”
The U.S. government
has blocked Huawei three times since the early 2000s from buying or merging
with U.S. telecommunications firms over spying concerns.
Australia has also
blocked Huawei from doing business there and Britain’s government has set up a
special security panel to review Huawei equipment used in Britain’s networks.
Dead wrong. Yes, the Australian government - under strong
pressure from the U.S. government – blocked Huawei from a government-sponsored
broadband network, but otherwise, Huawei is a major supplier of commercial communications network gear in Australia, and in the UK, where the government
has taken a commercially rational approach to legitimate security concerns.
A House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence report in 2012 identified Huawei and another
Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, as security threats that could facilitate electronic
spying by the Chinese government. The report concluded that U.S. companies
should not use any Chinese gear in networks.
The House report also
warned that other infrastructures, including electric power grids; banking and
finance systems; natural gas, oil, and water systems; and rail and shipping
channels all could be compromised by penetrating computerized control systems.
The HPSCI report is
almost universally recognized as vapid, utterly vacant, its findings and recommendations ungrounded by even basic facts. Look, don’t take my word for it, read
it - then you will understand why The Economist labelled it “a report for vegetarians”
(no meat).
An open-source U.S.
intelligence report from 2011 said Huawei was linked to the Ministry of State
Security, the civilian political police and intelligence service, through one
of its executives.
The CIA-based Open
Source Center report said Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang, worked for the
Ministry of State Security (MSS) Communications Department before joining the
company. The report said Sun used her connections at MSS to help Huawei through
“financial difficulties” when the company was founded in 1987.
Stuff and utter
nonsense, and Gertz knows it. The Open
Source Center report is nothing other than a non-classified regurgitation of articles in the open media, including, in one instance, a mis-informed report in an obscure
Chinese online publication that was later retracted, but only after it had been picked
up by other media.
China’s government has
paid Huawei more than $220 million for research and development in the past
decade.
Yawn. This is information openly available on
Huawei’s website. Huawei gets commercial
R&D grants from governments around the world, as do Huawei’s Western-based
peers, including from the Chinese government. Such grants make up a miniscule
fraction of Huawei’s annual $5+ billion in R&D investment.
The OSC report, dated
Oct. 5, said Huawei’s senior leaders have “connections” to the PLA. Huawei
founder Ren Zhengfei worked for China’s military from 1974 to 1983 in the
engineering corps.
I can barely bring
myself to bother on this one. “Connections?” And even Gertz puts it in quotes. And yes, Huawei’s founder was in the military
three decades ago. Big whoop.
Huawei’s headquarters
is located in Shenzen, China, the companies has plans for facilities in 10 U.S.
cities.
Gertz fails to get
even the most basic facts straight: Huawei has been in the U.S. since 2001 and
already has facilities in over 10 U.S. cities.