Fun With Facts: The Gertz Edition

Two days ago, the online radical conservative publication The Washington Free Beacon featured an article authored by Sino-phobe and habitual Huawei-basher Bill Gertz. 

Titled “Congress Targets Chinese Telecom Threat,” Gertz’s piece vomits up copious amounts of Huawei FUD and slander in its hyper-maniacal applause for a pair of Congressional amendments which, while setting trade-distorting precedents like-as-not to be used against American companies overseas, probably won't achieve much in terms of addressing any legitimate national security concerns.

Let’s parse through this turd of an article:

(And, lest anyone forget, Huawei is my employer, but the words, sentiments and opinions in this blog are mine and mine alone, unvetted by anyone).  

Gertz’s words are in italics, my observations, in bold:

Current House intelligence and defense legislation now before Congress is seeking to block U.S. intelligence officials from working for Chinese-linked companies, and also is aimed at preventing a major Chinese telecommunications firm from conducting cyber attacks against defense and intelligence networks.

“Chinese-linked companies?”  Uh…  In terms of the information and communications technology industry, that’s pretty much everyone.

Two amendments now part of the fiscal 2015 intelligence and defense authorization bills target China’s Huawei Technologies, a company linked by the U.S. government to electronic spying, although the company is not named specifically in the legislation, members of Congress and aides said.

The intelligence bill amendment would prevent former U.S. intelligence officials from joining companies like Huawei, which the U.S. government has linked to China’s military and illicit spying through its network equipment.

Except that is not the case.  First off, the U.S. Government has, in fact, never – never – cited a shred of credible evidence of any unusual link between Huawei and any government, nor has there ever been any allegation of illicit spying through Huawei network equipment or otherwise.  Being gracious, the USG has at most suggested only potential or prospective concerns. 

Indeed, with all of this in mind, and as explained to Gertz in an email exchange in advance of the publication of his article, the “covered entity” definition in the intelligence bill amendment in no way, shape or form applies to Huawei.  No-one – no-one – has ever once – not once – offered a shred of credible or substantive information to suggest otherwise.

The defense bill amendment would require the director of national intelligence and secretary of defense to report to Congress on all bids by foreign telecommunications companies seeking U.S. contracts.

Both measures are being dubbed the Rogers’ amendments after their Republican sponsors: Rep. Mike Rogers of Michigan, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and Rep. Mike Rogers of Alabama, chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces. “I am greatly concerned Chinese-government-controlled telecommunications companies could pose a direct threat to our national security,” said Rogers of Alabama who sponsored the defense amendment.

“We need to make sure we’re protecting all levels of our infrastructure,” he said. “This is an issue that affects big cities, small towns, and military bases in every corner of the U.S. and those overseas as well.”

These seem like legitimate concerns.  But contrary to Gertz’s or anyone else’s willfully uninformed opinion, Huawei is not “Chinese-government controlled,” so, as pointed out to Gertz via email before his article ran, the amendment has no relevancy to Huawei.

And, as further communicated to Gertz by email, the defense bill amendment is extremely worrisome in terms of its very broad and trade-distorting precedent-setting nature.  In this context, I commented to Gertz: “…One can only hope that a responsible, rational and transparent process will be developed and communicated to explain how a finding of “suspected of being influenced” might be made, and that strict and rational and transparent rules will be developed to define the character and fact-based validity of the substance of the required “Elements of Notification” (section c, 1-3).  Otherwise, the risk of generating copycat techno-nationalist like policy, law or regulations in other markets is great, and to the detriment of U.S. businesses operating overseas.”

Both amendments passed the House last month and now face House-Senate conferences.

Huawei spokesman Bill Plummer declined to comment on the legislation.

Well, I did offer the observations noted above, but Gertz seemed to have little interest in alternative perceptions.   He is correct, however, that I did not offer any official Huawei on-the-record comment – I mean, really, why would any company dignify this nonsense with a response?

Rep. Frank Wolf, (R., Va.) said he supports both measures, and specifically the intelligence employees restriction. Wolf was the first to reveal last year that Huawei had hired Theodore Moran, who worked on two government intelligence advisory panels at the same time he was paid consultant for the Chinese company.

“I think it’s good amendment and it’s a problem I think neither [Republican or Democratic] administration has addressed,” Wolf said in an interview. “When you get a guy connected to some of these groups who comes in and advises an administration on public policy, it’s not a good idea.”

Ah yes, Representative Wolf…  Another unabashed basher with questionable interest in the facts.  But hey, I'll give credit where credit is due: At least this time he didn’t reference George Clooney (for more on this and to put Rep. Wolf’s opinions in perspective, please see my April 29, 2012 blog post). 

Susan Phalen, a spokeswoman for the House intelligence committee, said the amendment is needed to protect secrets. Senior intelligence officials gain access to the nation’s most sensitive secrets during their careers, she said in an email.

“This provision would help avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of impropriety in post-government employment funded by governments that pose a high counterintelligence threat to the United States,” Phalen said. “These limits are analogous to the restrictions on executive and legislative branch employees who seek to lobby the federal government after they leave public service.”

I’ll leave her alone. She’s just a mouthpiece.

The global Chinese telecommunications equipment maker is widely viewed within the U.S. intelligence and military communities as an arm of the Chinese government that is engaged in clandestine intelligence collection through its equipment.

Nonsense.  There has never – never - been any USG claim that Huawei is “an arm of the Chinese government,” nor that the company is “engaged in clandestine intelligence collection through its equipment.”  As stated earlier, any ill-founded or politically-inspired concerns have virtually always been prospective.

The Pentagon’s annual report on the Chinese military has linked Huawei to Beijing’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). “Information technology companies in particular, including Huawei, Datang and Zhongxing, maintain close ties to the PLA,” a report several years ago said.

Yawn.  ‘Been reading this bullet since the 2005 Rand Report introduced the fallacy.  There is zero evidence to back it up. Never has been.

The first Rogers amendment is a response to the case of a senior adviser to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Theodore Moran, who worked for DNI as an adviser at the same time he was a paid consultant to Huawei.

The provision prevents all U.S. intelligence officials with access to sensitive compartmented information, the most secret classified information category, from working with suspect foreign companies for a period of one year after leaving government. For two years following retirement, covered intelligence officials cannot work for an outside foreign company on any matter relating to their work for spy agencies during the last year of employment.

It also would require former intelligence officials to report to their former agencies any payments received from suspect foreign employers.

Both requirements would be imposed for five years.

Seems reasonable.

The measure also requires the designation of certain governments that that are classified as “a significant counterintelligence threat,” such as China and Russia.

The Obama administration, according to observers, has been lax in pursuing foreign intelligence agents. Since the 2010 arrests of 10 Russian undercover agents, the administration has not apprehended a single significant foreign spy.

The second Rogers amendment calls on the defense secretary and DNI to notify Congress if every foreign-influenced company or its affiliate “is competing for, or has been awarded a contract” that could impact military or intelligence systems.

To the point I made to Gertz in our email exchange, how might “foreign-influenced” be determined?  Based on facts?

The legislation specifies the networks as “information technology or telecommunications networks of the Department of Defense or the intelligence community; and information technology or telecommunications networks of network operators supporting systems in proximity to Department of Defense or intelligence community facilities.”

A U.S. official said the provision is aimed at preventing companies like Huawei from infiltrating rural U.S. and other networks through sales of equipment to local telecommunications firms, as has occurred in the past, in an effort to avoid federal security scrutiny.

“Infiltrating?”  “An effort to avoid federal security scrutiny?”  Good grief. Huawei has been operating openly in the United States since 2001, serving a number of carriers, rural and otherwise, as a result of open and competitive bidding processes. 

“We’ve seen Huawei go under the radar in seeking to infiltrate rural providers,” the official said. “We have to be careful that we don’t wake up in five years and find that 20 percent of the country is using Huawei equipment.”

“Under the radar?”  See above.  Who is this shallow, duplicitous scare-mongering “official” that Gertz is quoting? 

The amendment also was written broadly enough to capture the recent deal between Huawei and South Korea’s LG that has raised concerns about the security of U.S. military communications in a potential war zone.

U.S. intelligence and military officials have said allowing Huawei to build a South Korean network could compromise U.S. military communications in a future conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Chris Bush, a spokesman for the U.S. Forces Korea, told the Free Beacon last month that the command is concerned about the contract between Huawei and the South Korean company LG as a potential security problem.

“Telecommunications equipment is inherently vulnerable to a multitude of threats, from interception and monitoring to malicious software and applications, regardless of service provider,” Bush said in response to questions about the Huawei-LG deal.

Hey. Wait…

“Telecommunications equipment is inherently vulnerable to a multitude of threats, from interception and monitoring to malicious software and applications, regardless of service provider…” 

Spot on Chris.  I mean, the NSA has certainly proven this point, and, further, has demonstrated that it doesn’t matter which company built the gear, nor where any company may be headquartered.

Rogers of Michigan said earlier this year that he opposes permitting Huawei to set up a telecommunications network in South Korea.

“Allowing Huawei equipment into South Korea’s advanced wireless network could create dangerous operational security vulnerabilities for the U.S. and South Korean military and government personnel who will inevitably use this network,” Rogers said.

"Intelligence" Committee Chairman?  Really?  

Huawei is supplying commercial telecommunications infrastructure equipment built to open and globally-specified technical standards for deployment by a commercial operator in a commercial network in South Korea.   

Really Mike?  Our military and government are sending secure communications over open commercial wireless networks?

The defense amendment would require the DNI to report to Congress annually on whether suspect foreign companies are competing for or were awarded contracts related to information technology or telecommunications components.

“Suspect?”  See comments above about “foreign-influenced.”

The U.S. government has blocked Huawei three times since the early 2000s from buying or merging with U.S. telecommunications firms over spying concerns.

Australia has also blocked Huawei from doing business there and Britain’s government has set up a special security panel to review Huawei equipment used in Britain’s networks.

Dead wrong.  Yes, the Australian government - under strong pressure from the U.S. government – blocked Huawei from a government-sponsored broadband network, but otherwise, Huawei is a major supplier of commercial communications network gear in Australia, and in the UK, where the government has taken a commercially rational approach to legitimate security concerns.

A House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence report in 2012 identified Huawei and another Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, as security threats that could facilitate electronic spying by the Chinese government. The report concluded that U.S. companies should not use any Chinese gear in networks.

The House report also warned that other infrastructures, including electric power grids; banking and finance systems; natural gas, oil, and water systems; and rail and shipping channels all could be compromised by penetrating computerized control systems.

The HPSCI report is almost universally recognized as vapid, utterly vacant, its findings and recommendations ungrounded by even basic facts.  Look, don’t take my word for it, read it - then you will understand why The Economist labelled it “a report for vegetarians” (no meat).

An open-source U.S. intelligence report from 2011 said Huawei was linked to the Ministry of State Security, the civilian political police and intelligence service, through one of its executives.

The CIA-based Open Source Center report said Huawei’s chairwoman, Sun Yafang, worked for the Ministry of State Security (MSS) Communications Department before joining the company. The report said Sun used her connections at MSS to help Huawei through “financial difficulties” when the company was founded in 1987.

Stuff and utter nonsense, and Gertz knows it.  The Open Source Center report is nothing other than a non-classified regurgitation of articles in the open media, including, in one instance, a mis-informed report in an obscure Chinese online publication that was later retracted, but only after it had been picked up by other media. 

China’s government has paid Huawei more than $220 million for research and development in the past decade.

Yawn.  This is information openly available on Huawei’s website.  Huawei gets commercial R&D grants from governments around the world, as do Huawei’s Western-based peers, including from the Chinese government. Such grants make up a miniscule fraction of Huawei’s annual $5+ billion in R&D investment.

The OSC report, dated Oct. 5, said Huawei’s senior leaders have “connections” to the PLA. Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei worked for China’s military from 1974 to 1983 in the engineering corps.

I can barely bring myself to bother on this one.  “Connections?”  And even Gertz puts it in quotes.  And yes, Huawei’s founder was in the military three decades ago.  Big whoop.

Huawei’s headquarters is located in Shenzen, China, the companies has plans for facilities in 10 U.S. cities.

Gertz fails to get even the most basic facts straight: Huawei has been in the U.S. since 2001 and already has facilities in over 10 U.S. cities.

Surveillance Competition, Take Two...

Two days ago, I blogged on the recent revelation that U.S. intelligence agencies have been intercepting American-made routers and servers and inserting backdoors so that they can penetrate networks in markets in which the gear is deployed (link to my May 13 post).

Since then, the story has continued, including with ars technica running photos yesterday of busy beaver agents “upgrading" Cisco routers at a “secret location” (link).  No shit.

In the post I made a couple of days ago, borrowing from Glenn Greenwald’s Monday unveiling of the NSA’s export interception hijinks (link), I tied the new revelation to the politico-protectionist market access barriers that my employer Huawei Technologies has experienced in the U.S.

Following, is my nutshell synopsis of what’s been going on and why the U.S. Government has been blockading Huawei at home, and attempting to blackball the company abroad (Australia, South Korea, etc.):

Over the last few years, Huawei has grown to become either the leading or number two telecommunications infrastructure provider globally, with Huawei routers and servers and other gear becoming commonplace across the planet.

This turn of events has made the NSA’s eavesdropping practices ever-so-slightly more challenging.  It is far easier to re-route U.S. exports through “secret locations” for beacon-implants than to similarly compromise Huawei gear shipping from elsewhere to elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the NSA has attempted to maintain its overwhelming surveillance footprint through its Shotgiant program which, among other things, stole Huawei proprietary product info with the intent to compromise Huawei gear where deployed (link to my March 25 post on the topic), but it would seem this is a far less efficient model than surreptitious interception and “upgrade” of outbound U.S. exports.

What do to, what to do?

Impede Huawei’s global business. Stymie and attempt to roll back Huawei’s worldwide share so that the NSA's eavesdropping activities could be most easily and broadly managed.

How?

Demonize the company, starting with the U.S. market blockade, then extending to arm-twisting in foreign markets.  The blockade was key.  If Huawei had been allowed an even marginally-significant footprint in the U.S., it would have both furthered the company’s global success and market share, and undermined U.S. Government smear and blackball campaigns in other markets.

I’m not sure this policy is working.

The U.S. strong-arm tactics had some success in Australia, in terms of Huawei not being considered for the government-sponsored national broadband network (NBN) project, but they haven't prevented Huawei from successfully serving Australian commercial network operators.  And, more recent U.S. Government attempts to undermine competition and choice in South Korea seem to have fallen flat altogether.

Worse yet, this week’s revelations from Greenwald may well have yet further adverse impact on the overseas prospects for networking gear from U.S. suppliers, yet further hampering the NSA’s ability to conduct surveillance (not to mention wreaking some potentially not-insignificant commercial havoc for the victimized companies).

Look, I’m not saying that the U.S. government should not be engaged in espionage and intelligence-gathering that is critical to maintaining our national security (although I would observe that the domestic overreach that the Snowden Revelations have detailed over the last 11 months is truly reprehensible).

But the policy and practices have failed, both in terms of the exposure of the NSA’s compromise of U.S. Internet and telecommunications service providers and, as recently learned, ICT gear-makers as well, but also in terms of demonizing a world-respected ICT leader like Huawei (and in so doing also depriving American service providers and consumers of innovative and competitive broadband equipment alternatives).

It’s time for a reset.  Across the board.

While we’ve not likely heard the last from Snowden, et al, the crisis of confidence in the ICT industry is reaching a fever pitch. At stake is a global and interdependent economy that increasingly relies on digital and virtual tools and processes.

It’s time for industry and governments to come together to restore confidence in network and data integrity and security – in the Internet itself – and to do so in a rational, pragmatic, and non-political fashion.   See any number of my posts over the last year for thoughts on how this might happen.

America’s Cyber-Contortionist (and Free Trade Champion? – Not)

Just a few days ago, cyber-security specialists and senior government representatives met in Germany at the 50^th annual Munich Security Conference.  

Since 1963, the MSC has served as “an independent forum dedicated to promoting peaceful conflict resolution and international cooperation and dialogue in dealing with today’s and future security challenges.” (More at: https://www.securityconference.de/en/).

Needless to say, in recent years, the MSC has focused on security challenges in the realm of cyber.  This year’s sessions were no different.  One session in particular stood out for me: The January 31 Panel Discussion focused on: "Rebooting Trust? Freedom vs. Security in Cyberspace."

The President of Estonia made an opening statement, and then the CEO of Deutsche Telekom introduced the panelists, including the German Minister of the Interior, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Microsoft’s VP of Security, Huawei’s Chief Security Officer (reminder: Huawei is my employer), and the Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Mike Rogers. 

The panel was moderated by the President of the EastWest Institute, an organization founded in 1980 which “seeks to make the world a safer place by addressing the seemingly intractable problems that threaten regional and global stability.” (More on EWI at http://www.ewi.info/).

Generally speaking, the panelists (almost all) acknowledged the shattered trust in the information communication technology industry (and select governments) in the wake of the Snowden revelations.  Likewise, the panelists (most) detailed possible steps towards restoring confidence.

One panelist, however, stuck out like a sore thumb (one cannot imagine the countless phrases I considered and rejected for that analogy): Chairman Mike.

Go figure.

Mike opened with an acknowledgment that there is “a trust issue,” but pondered aloud about why the group was really gathered: “Damaging classified information that was leaked?  Maybe so.”  But, Mike thinks not.  Indeed, Mike commented that he was “a little surprised” that people were talking about “the problems with the NSA.” 

The Chairman then transitioned into scare-mongering about Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, etc., oozed into an explanation that reports of U.S. spying on French phone calls were misrepresented, and, subsequently, segued to his key mis-direction of the day:  

“The most recent release of information…the United States engages in economic espionage…I have been on the oversight committee doing oversight for our 16 intelligence agencies…for the last ten years…It is against the law in the United States to use our intelligence services for industrial espionage…If they do it, they are going to jail. Period. End of story.” 

Now that’s only part one of the mis-direction, but let’s take a brief time-out to consider it.

Last September I posted on Mike’s utter failure to conduct the oversight with which he is charged (link), so I won’t belabor that point.  But, since he has raised laws and jail, let’s hold him to it: If future revelations show that such industrial espionage did take place, then Mike, by virtue of his position, is aware of and as such complicit to such “illegal” activity and he should be summarily incarcerated…

…But let’s get back to the Chairman’s key mis-direction, part two:

Per Mike: “Now wouldn’t you find it interesting that that information was released at a time when we’re trying to arrange a trade arrangement that I think benefits both Europe and the United States…  I do…”

This little nugget doesn’t get fully matured until the Q&A session, but, the gist: The Russians are managing Snowden in order to time his revelations to tank U.S.-EU Free Trade talks.

In the Q&A session, Mike hammers it home: “I think it’s a huge mistake to allow this issue…to step in the way of a trade agreement between Europe and the United States.  These are two very separate issues…but by tying them together I will guarantee you that you will see more disclosures like we saw last week that the Americans engage in economic espionage…” 

He went on: “You’re gonna see more of that because it breeds distrust – the Russians have a specific purpose for driving a wedge between us and our European allies.”

The Chairman is wrong.  

Not in terms of our seeing further revelations, but in terms of his interpretation of the “tie” between European privacy concerns and the U.S.-EU Free Trade talks.

Europeans have every right to consider privacy protections in the context of U.S.-EU Free Trade negotiations – the former might (albeit unlikely) serve as leverage towards achieving some sort of protections in the context of agreeing the latter, although not likely in the actual substance of any trade agreement.  That is a legitimate tie.  Mike’s suggestion that the Russians are somehow orchestrating the tie borders on absurd.

It gets worse.  Following his initial suggestion that the Russians are orchestrating revelations, and in advance of his Q&A session elaboration on this point, Mike goes on to propel himself headlong into a trap he has set for himself more than once in recent months: 

In defending the integrity and due process of U.S. espionage activities, the Chairman refers to “an oversight mechanism that is not seen anywhere else in the world.  Our judicial branch, our…legislative branch, and our executive branch have to go through an approval process for these activities… that is an important distinction and we argue that is our transparency.”

Sigh. 

Really?  That reference, and the Chairman’s subsequent Q&A session reference to the FISA court and 4^th Amendment protections, are both to processes that only apply to American citizens, and, seemingly, only within U.S. borders, and, from what we have had revealed to us by Mr. Snowden, perhaps not at all. 

One thing is certain though: Europeans and other non-Americans do not benefit from any such oversight or Constitutional prophylaxis (as was pointed out by one clued-in questioner).

C’mon Mike. C’mon America.  Is this the best we have, is this the best we can do?  

(Link to video of the full 1.5 hour panel discussion)

Politics, Intelligence and Lies: Get a Clue(train)

My last three posts have been on the topic of PRISM (so, I'll not bother with links - just click the preceding entries)...

As the story continues to play out, I am seeing patterns of misinformation, disinformation and out-and-out lies that we've seen before, recently in terms of Benghazi, over a decade ago in Iraq, and, finally, very personal to me, in the context of my (still-gainful) employment over the last three years

Notwithstanding the protestations from the U.S. Government, it seems clear that whatever the Government's intent, PRISM infringes - actually or prospectively (being gracious) - on the personal liberties and rights of American citizens, and, hopefully of some concern to my countrymen, completely and utterly violates the rights and personal information of innocent non-U.S. citizens.

Some would label the Government's protestations misinformation.  That might be generous.  At the same time, we do indeed have an essential need to gather intelligence to secure our homeland.  Our challenge - dramatically multiplied in the wake of PRISM's outing - is to do so while balancing our obligations to the liberties and privacy of our countrymen, and other innocents abroad.

Turn to Benghazi, one of three burning scandals in Washington these days.  I'll dismiss the other two: IRS/Tea Party and FBI/AP/Fox - the former being a dumb reflection of how polarized our nation has become (but hardly a strategic initiative from the top); the latter, not to diminish the unique nature of tapping the 4th estate, being little more than an extension of everything PRISM is about.

Adversaries are slamming the Administration for having orchestrated lies about Benghazi, initially explaining away insufficient security as unfortunate happenstance - who could have predicted the spontaneous uprising over a spurious YouTube video? Notwithstanding the current wisdom that it was an Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist assault, some might think that either story is just another cover-up.

Indeed, at least one rumor has it that Benghazi was targeted because the U.S. compound was a transshipment point to illegally funnel arms to Syrian rebels.  I'm not saying I buy into this, but, I do perceive more misinformation, which, if true, would mean that some of the Congressional folk assaulting the Administration are disingenuous, all the more so knowing that the Administration cannot defend itself. 

Some would call this back-and-forth partisan bickering an instance of conflicting disinformation campaigns, or worse. Most, at the very least, would call it politics. Whatever intelligence the Government may have had in advance of, during or after Benghazi, the one thing that seems sure is that the American people will very likely never know.

Flash back a decade-and-change, to a time when we, the American people, were sold an ugly bill of goods (WMDs in Iraq) to justify a war.  It matters not whether there was some alternate good cause for such a conflict - and I am a firm supporter of our troops in any context - it matters that the pretext for war was trumped up.  Fake intelligence.

Some might call these lies.

And now (indulge me this brief paragraph and then read on - I do return to the broader issues), we come to Huawei, my employer.  For the last three years (and earlier, but my tenure only extends that far), Huawei has been repeatedly maligned and slandered by various and sundry U.S. Government and Congressional authorities, alleged, without a whit of proof, of being susceptible to Chinese Government penetration and compromise.  No need to even fake any intelligence.

I have called this disinformation.  I have called this politics.  (See the last couple of years' posts on this blog).

The American people deserve better from our Government.  

In 1999, little known to other than the digerati (or geeks like me), online activists seeking to reintroduce humanity to the corporate world via technology, issued a document known as "The Cluetrain Manifesto" (linked).  The Manifesto proclaimed that "through the Internet, people are discovering and inventing new ways to share relevant knowledge...getting smarter faster than most companies."

The Manifesto continued: "Most corporations...only know how to talk in the soothing, humorless monotone of the mission statement, marketing brochure, and your-call-is-important-to-us busy signal. Same old tones, same old lies."  Sound familiar?  

Focused on the conversation between consumers and businesses, and highlighting that the Internet was shifting "power" from the latter to the former, Cluetrain called on corporations to engage in a real and open dialogue, with their continued commercial success in the information age be imperiled.

Of the 95 Thesis included in the Manifesto, a number of them - most of them - seem quite relevant to the current relationship between American citizens and their Government, and the need for change.

A handful of examples:

• Companies need to come down from their Ivory Towers and talk to the people with whom they hope to create relationships.

• The inflated self-important jargon you sling around—in the press, at your conferences—what's that got to do with us?

• Command-and-control management styles both derive from and reinforce bureaucracy, power tripping and an overall culture of paranoia.

• Companies make a religion of security, but this is largely a red herring. Most are protecting less against competitors than against their own market and workforce.

• Elvis said it best: "We can't go on together with suspicious minds."

It is time America. 

Time to demand less politics, less misinformation, fewer lies.  It is time for real and interactive dialogue.